Adolf Berle During the New Deal:
The Brain Truster as an Intellectual Jobber
Robert B. Thompson
INTRODUCTION
Adolf Berle’s ideas have attained a remarkable longevity in corporate
law with an influence exceeding that of any other twentieth century law
professor.1 Participants in the now ten Berle symposia often have framed
the discussion of his career as an intellectual history, usually built around
the powerful transformative effect of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (MCPP).2 Yet this approach is insufficient to explain
large parts of Berle’s professional career, including what Berle did during
the twelve years of the Roosevelt Administration that immediately
followed MCPP. This Article offers an alternative focus that better
accounts for the career of an intellectual jobber, as Berle described
himself. Intellectual history is still relevant—how could it not be when
ideas were Berle’s stock in trade—but political history is at the forefront
of this account, with particular attention to the interaction of Berle’s
personal traits in this historical context, particularly his inclination to focus
on one-off settings into which he could parachute and quickly exit.
This opening section provides introductory observations as to:
Berle’s biography before, during, and after the New Deal; the evolution of
his writing during those periods; and the personal traits that shaped his
entire professional life. Parts I and II focus on Berle during the Roosevelt
Administration, the first five years based in New York City (but still an
important participant in the President’s circle) and the last seven at the
 Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University. I am grateful to Bill
Bratton, Daniel Ernst and Brad Snyder for sharing comments and sources about the New Deal and
Berle and to Elizabeth Pollman for linking Berle the corporate academic to his writing on broader
policy issues. Jeremy Goldstein and Sherry Yu provided helpful research on this project.
1. Some have gone further, such as the editors of the LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS who
described Berle as “one of the most influential public policy intellectuals of the Twentieth Century.”
See 4 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 36–37 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1975)
[hereinafter BRANDEIS LETTERS].
2. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (N.Y., Harcourt, Brace & World, rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter MCPP].

663

664

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:663

State Department (and immediately adjacent to the White House). Part III
is a briefer treatment of his time after the New Deal. Each part develops
an observation visible in each setting—Berle as a brain truster, intellectual
jobber, and public intellectual. He was able to command most any topic
on short notice and articulate a vision of a changed role for government in
the economy, but less able to effectively implement policies reflecting
those ideas. Part II.B takes a deep dive into the preparations of the
American government during the time that Berle was at the State
Department for a post-war international economic order, particularly
planning for new international institutions in trade, monetary policy, and
assembling global capital. This examination is valuable, independent of
any discussion of Berle, for framing Brexit, Trump, and key current
disagreements on the global economic stage, but it also helps understand
Berle and his role during the New Deal.
Berle was raised mostly in the Boston area, recognized as a child
prodigy before entering Harvard College at age fourteen, followed by
Harvard Law and a job at the Brandeis firm. World War I intervened,
providing experiences that stimulated his life-long interests in Latin
America and diplomacy, but even more significantly led him to turn away
from his Boston and Harvard roots and make his way in New York City.
There, his public commentary on foreign affairs, involvement in Native
American issues in the West, and living in the Henry Street settlement
gave way to a determined focus to reframe corporate law for a new era.3
In 1932, his book with Gardiner Means, MCPP, set out the separation of
ownership and control in the American corporation that shaped federal
regulatory policy in corporate law for the remainder of the century.4 A
contemporaneous exchange on the pages of the Harvard Law Review with
Merrick Dodd framed a debate on the purpose of the corporation—for the
benefit of shareholders or other stakeholders—that still anchors
contemporary discussions of that topic.5 During that same year, as a
3. Jordan Schwarz’s biography of Berle very effectively covers this and other parts of Berle’s
life. See generally JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN
ERA (1987). For Berle’s focus on foreign affairs in his writing between 1919 and 1923, see the thirteen
articles listed in that period in the bibliography, The Published Works of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1372, 1373 (1964) [hereinafter Published Works]. Between 1923 and 1931, Berle published
fourteen law review articles on corporate law, mostly in the Harvard and Columbia Law Reviews. Id.
4. See generally MCPP, supra note 2.
5. See generally Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932) and Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932), which were published respectively in the May and June 1932 issues of
the Harvard Law Review after the Berle and Means book had been finished but before its publication
and just as Berle began working on FDR’s campaign. Dodd’s piece had been a response to an earlier
article by Berle published the prior year. See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Law as Powers in Trust, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). William Bratton and Michael Wachter have shown that the actual 1932
exchange between Berle and Dodd does not have as much purchase for the contemporary
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member of the brain trust for Franklin Roosevelt (and the speechwriter for
the candidate’s important Commonwealth Club Speech during the fall
campaign), Berle’s voice helped elect a President and bring in the New
Deal with its massive changes in American government.6 For the thirtyseven-year-old law professor, those three accomplishments in one year
amounted to an intellectual trifecta.
Somewhat surprisingly, Berle did not go into the new Administration
after the election, as did other brain trusters. Rather, he went back to New
York City to his law practice and teaching at Columbia and being a brain
truster for Fiorello LaGuardia in the 1933 and 1937 mayoral campaigns.
In between he served as Chamberlain for the city (the last Chamberlain
before the job was abolished), all the while maintaining access to the
President, taking on specific tasks for him, and regularly helping develop
and explain economic policy.7 Berle joined the Roosevelt Administration
full time in 1938 as Assistant Secretary of State, staying for the next seven
years and then an additional year as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. His
portfolio still reflected his access to the President and presidential
assignments, including some delicate matters related to intelligence and
alleged communist infiltration. He was positioned to have a key role in
planning the post-war international economic structure, which was
ongoing from the time war broke out in Europe in mid-1939. This process
led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the World Trade Organization that provide the basis for contemporary
international interaction in monetary affairs, development, and trade. One
of the earliest meetings with John Maynard Keynes on the British side took
place in Berle’s office, and he was a key link in discussions with the British
about post-war economic matters.8
After the war, with a new President and a new set of presidential
advisers, Berle returned to New York City to teach at Columbia, work with
foundations, and generally pursue the role of a public intellectual.9 Having
essentially stopped publishing in law reviews10 and producing little in the
shareholder/stakeholder primacy discussions as modern writers may see. The two professors were on
different wings of a then-current corporatist approach to corporate theory and each writer later changed
his position in ways that blur where they would stand in the modern debate that invokes their names.
See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008).
6. See William W. Bratton, The Modern Corporation and Private Property Revisited: Gardiner
Means and the Administered Price, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 591 (2019) (discussing the Commonwealth
Club speech and Berle’s role in the campaign).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See Adolf A. Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938). See
generally Published Works, supra note 3. There were two law review articles in the 1933–1945 period:
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way of books11 during the twelve years of the Roosevelt Administration,
Berle again picked up his writing. Much of Berle’s law review writing of
the post-war period returned to specific aspects of corporate law.12 The
books picked up on the themes of MCPP but the corporatist threads of the
earlier work had given way to what Bill Bratton has called a happier story
where “big stick” government had emerged to keep corporations in line.13
By the time of Berle’s death in 1971, this political economy approach had
been challenged by competing ideologies, including what would become
the market-based deregulatory corporate law theories that flowered during
the 1980s.14
The political history of the period enhances the understanding of the
evolution of Berle’s career. In the 1920s he was still gathering ideas and
data about structural changes in the corporate space in a post-industrial
revolution economy. His focus was on building-out a new understanding
of corporate finance in an economic environment where the Berle and
Means corporation held center stage.15 Even so, most of his ideas for
reform clustered around protecting shareholders against management
overreaching, ideas that by themselves in the “normalcy” of the 1920s
would not have commanded lasting attention. Yet, with the return of a
progressive Democrat to the presidency, and the transformative expansion
of the federal government in the wake of the unprecedented economic
one a five-page printing of his commencement remarks at Cornell Law School in 1938 and the other
a fourteen-page, post-1934 follow-up of his 1931 article on liability for stock market manipulation. Id.
11. See Published Works, supra note 3. Between 1933 and 1945 he published a new edition of
his casebook on corporate finance (with a co-author), a short French tract on man and property, a
twenty-one-page book: ADOLF A BERLE, JR., NATIONAL REALISM AND CHRISTIAN FAITH (1940), and
a book on liquidity, co-authored with a student, that addressed new forms of liquidity for property
including particularly ownership of shares in modern corporations. Two books from this period related
to his government service are addressed later in this Article: one a book based on his testimony to
TNEC in 1939 regarding government providing of capital and the other his 1940 book, NEW
DIRECTIONS AND THE NEW WORLD, based on a series of articles he had written about the state of world
affairs. See infra note 63; SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 211 and accompanying text.
12. For example, a 1952 article on corporate personhood reflects some of the big picture ideas
of the separation of ownership and control brought forward a couple of decades with analysis of links
to contemporary debates on constitutional rights of corporations. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional
Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952). Other articles address control theory in corporations and
enterprise liability that seem to grow out of early Berle. See Published Works, supra note 3.
13. Bratton, supra note 6. Bratton discusses Means’s focus on administering prices—in Means’s
dissertation but omitted from MCPP, yet essential to understanding the ideas in the book.
14. A conference held at Stanford in 1982 on the 50th Anniversary of the publication of MCPP
represents the new movement’s challenge to Berle and Means. See Conference, Corporations and
Private Property, 26 J. L. ECON. 235 (1983). Bill Bratton’s contribution in this symposium discusses
Means’s participation in that conference and the newcomers’ challenge to the Berle and Means thesis
evidenced at that conference.
15. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle–Means Corporation, 42 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 445 (2019).
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calamity of the Great Depression and then world war, there was room for
new approaches. The New Deal essentially added one new financial statute
per year until the outbreak of World War II that cumulatively sought to
bring more social control over finance.16 Berle’s explanations provided
fertile ground to support the growth of such broad change.17 During this
time, Berle was in (or within sight of) the mainstream of political
developments. Thereafter, politics became too wide and too deep; his
sallies into the larger political space were briefer and fewer and he spent
more time in the protected coves of foundations and the university.18
Berle’s personal traits certainly shaped his political role and he surely
benefited from another political development of the period—changes in
the staffing of the presidency and the executive branch that made room for
the brain truster role he most valued. He served such a function for David
Lilienthal in Wisconsin before FDR and for LaGuardia in New York City
afterwards.19 The term, however, does not necessarily suggest a precise
definition. For Berle, it meant a freelancer as to ideas and a free agent. As
he described himself in a letter after the election in 1932, “I shall choose
merely . . . being an intellectual jobber and contractor from time to time
when jobs come forward.”20 This was “to have in life the thing that he most
wants.”21 The “free” part seems to have been key. Full of ideas, he believed

16. This legislation included the following: Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat.
74; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803; 1938 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 (the Chandler Act), Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840; 1938 Amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Maloney Act), Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070; Trust Indenture Act of
1939, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54
Stat. 789; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847.
17. There is something of a disconnect between Berle’s early corporate law writings from the
1920s and his responses to the Depression. Both are contained in MCPP and the relationship is
sometimes hard to reconcile. William Bratton and Michael Wachter, in a series of articles singly and
together, have provided a helpful typology identifying “early”, “middle”, and “late” Berle. Both early
and middle Berle are interspersed in MCPP—a disconcerting result—but one that reflects the changing
political trends in the wake of the economic calamity at the end of the 1920s. See Bratton & Wachter,
supra note 5, at 121.
18. This analogy derives from an insight of Dan Ernst.
19. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 72.
20. Letter from August A. Berle to John Hanna, Columbia Law Professor (Nov. 16, 1932), in
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918-1971, at 80–81 (Beatrice B. Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973)
(“[S]hort of some particular set of circumstances imposing a real obligation, I should be merely foolish
to trade this for the mazes of official life in Washington.”). For Berle’s use of this “intellectual jobber”
term in a different context, see Harwell Wells,“All Lawyers are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle
and the Modern Legal Profession, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 641 (2019).
21. Letter from August A. Berle to John Hanna, in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at
81.
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he could take on a wide range of issues and then was on to the next
challenge, often without the need to stay long on a particular topic.22
At the same time, other personal traits limited his effectiveness in the
roles he undertook after 1932. He was unquestionably smart. He believed
he could do almost anything: solve the sugar problem in the Dominican
Republic; become a Russian expert simply by stepping behind a desk at
an Army hall in World War I; join in the heady days of peace talks with
little more than university degrees.23 Two other qualities, however, limited
his effectiveness. First, he regularly preferred one-off tasks, serving as the
intellectual jobber and free-lancer that he described in his 1932
explanation as to why he would go back to New York City.
Implementation of policy did not hold nearly the attraction for him that
ideas or solving a particular problem did. Even when he went to the State
Department (in 1938 and again in 1961 as discussed below), he thought he
could do what needed to be done in six months and then be on to something
else. The semester-long period of a professor’s typical class may have
been his optimal time target. Second and probably a side effect of the first
quality, it was a challenge for him to work as part of a team. As a New
York newspaper columnist concluded, when Berle went to Washington,
“the widespread conviction that Berle is just as good as he says doesn’t
make him any easier to take.”24 Co-workers found him a challenge, not
just for his ego and vanity but also for his impact on team production. “He
works in every direction, with or without instructions,” one colleague said;
“Berle’s sphere of activity is still more or less of an enigma.”25 His
strengths that stood out in drafting speeches for the President or presenting
the structure of an academic article worked less well in a two- or threeyear process to build out a detailed system of post-war international
economic agencies. Berle’s quick mind didn’t give him the detailed

22. His biographer, Jordan Schwarz, includes an example of how Berle “acquired expertise
quickly” as “a clever man bent upon capturing the ears of men in power.” See SCHWARZ, supra note
3, at 23–24. As Berle told the story in an oral history at Columbia Law School in 1969, he was at the
Army War College near the end of World War I awaiting reassignment after service in the Dominican
Republic. The officer at the desk where Berle was standing received orders for Siberia and
immediately left the building. Berle assumed the position behind the desk and was confronted by an
orderly with a colonel’s request for the current exchange rate of Finnish marks. Berle retrieved a
newspaper from the trash, answered the colonel’s question, and soon received several additional
queries which Berle answered. When the colonel subsequently appeared to see who had been
answering his questions, he made Berle his “expert” on Russian economics. See Transcript of Oral
History Interview: Reminiscences of Adolf A. Berle, Jr.: Oral History 32–34 (1969) (on file at the
Oral Research Office of Columbia University) [hereinafter Reminiscences].
23. See supra infra Parts I–II; sources cited note 22.
24. Rodney Dutcher, In Washington, TELEGRAPH-HERALD, Feb. 16, 1938, at 6.
25. Diary of Breckenridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State 233 (Dec. 20, 1940) (on file with
author).
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knowledge of monetary control and trade restrictions that the international
process needed.
I. INFLUENCING THE NEW DEAL FROM NEW YORK CITY, 1933–1937
After the election in 1932, other prominent members of the brain
trust entered the Administration—Raymond Moley as Assistant Secretary
of State, for example, and Rexford Tugwell as Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture. Berle continued to be based in New York, teaching law at
Columbia and practicing law with his brother.26
That did not keep him from regular tasks for the President. During
the period between the election and inauguration (then a four-month
period, six weeks longer than the current transition), Berle worked on
railroad reorganization, sparking a disagreement with another FDR
advisor from academia, Felix Frankfurter, his former professor.27 Berle
was willing to acknowledge the reality of size in the modern economy and
have government regulate big corporations while Frankfurter’s approach
was aligned with the Brandeisian model of breaking up large entities to
enhance competition among small participants.28 Right after the
inauguration, Roosevelt designated Berle and others to meet at Treasury
with the Federal Reserve, private bankers, and others on the banking crisis.
Berle was named secretary of a subgroup of five to develop a specific
scheme for Congress.29 Over the first six months of the new
Administration, he commuted from New York as a special assistant on
railroad matters to Jesse Jones, chair of the Reconstruction Finance
26. Berle also served on the advisory board of the New York Stock Exchange during his time in
New York, among other activities.
27. See Diary of Raymond Moley (Jan. 11, 1933) (on file with Raymond Moley Papers, Box 1)
(noting Berle’s conversation with Moley including Berle expressing the view that Frankfurter was out
to ruin him). In a letter to FDR about Frankfurter’s intervention, Berle signed the letter: “Yours truly,
in a mean state of mind, with considerable admiration for F.F’s public career and an intense personal
desire to see him shot.” Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt, in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS,
supra note 20, at 83. The Berle–Frankfurter relationship, seemingly, was never good. Frankfurter had
joined the Harvard law faculty during Berle’s second year as a law student. See Roscoe Pound,
Frankfurter at Harvard, in FRANKFURTER, A TRIBUTE 137 (Wallace Mendelsohn ed., 1964). Joseph
P. Lash, in a biographical essay accompanying the Diary of Felix Frankfurter, suggested, “There was
always an edge to Berle’s opposition, a touch of resentment, at having been excluded from
Frankfurter’s little elite group of disciples at Harvard Law School.” Joseph B. Lash, Biographical
Essay, in FROM THE DIARY OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 44 (Joseph P. Lash ed. 1975). Jordan Schwarz
suggested the student had given offense to the somewhat older professor: “Their ambition seemed to
need each other’s enmity.” SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 15.
28. See Telegram from Frankfurter to Raymond Moley (Jan. 12, 1933) (on file with Raymond
Moley Papers, Box 68) (“[I] am greatly disturbed after talking with Berle lest governor be
embarrassingly involved in support of railroad reorganization bill . . . .”). A reorganization bill passed
on the last day of the Hoover Administration. This disagreement between Berle and Frankfurter
reappeared at various points in the future.
29. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 86.
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Corporation. He resigned that position September 1 when Roosevelt sent
him with Sumner Welles (later the Undersecretary of State who brought
Berle to the State Department) on a special mission to Havana to deal with
Cuban instability.30
Throughout this early period, Berle was central in developing core
economic ideas of the New Deal. He shared with other brain trusters,
Moley and Tugwell, a faith in more state planning for the economy. Early
on this was evidenced in the corporatist planning approach of the National
Industrial Recovery Act that was passed in the first hundred days of the
New Deal providing space for corporations collectively to decide on rules
for competition.31 This centerpiece of the early New Deal industrial policy
empowered the National Recovery Administration to oversee broad
industry agreement on prices and other matters, but ultimately proved
unsuccessful in practice even before it was struck down by the Supreme
Court in 1935.32 During FDR’s second term, as the economic malaise
continued, Berle embraced the Keynesian idea of government spending to
stimulate the economy. Throughout the first two terms, Berle advocated
for multiple means to provide more state capital, a view shared by Jesse
Jones, whose Reconstruction Finance Corporation financed multiple New
Deal programs. Berle looked to others with similar ideas including, for
example, Robert Moses, whose planning for New York City was just
beginning to takes shape when Berle was Chamberlain, and Hjalmar
Schacht, the finance chief of the Third Reich until 1937.33 The idea of
using government capital to enhance the growth of private corporations
was an idea that Berle shared with John Maynard Keynes even before the
specific interactions between the two discussed in Part II.
These tasks and the ideas Berle wrote about provided him a seat at
the table but did not make him a major actor in FDR’s now famous first
hundred days. Berle had a public role in the debate around each of the
economic ideas just discussed, although (equally as telling) he had no
significant role in drafting any of the statutes of 1933 or thereafter or in
organizing the agencies that were created to administer the burgeoning
administrative state, other than a brief stint at the RFC in 1933.
30. Id. at 82, 90–91.
31. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
32. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See generally ELLIS
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 28 (1995). See also id. at 460–61
(describing an early version of the planning orientation—versus competition enhancing or spending—
as set forth by Berle in a widely publicized memorandum in July 1938 discussing the lines of inquiry
that TNEC might pursue, in which Berle argued TNEC should not assume that all monopoly was bad,
that cartels were necessarily harmful, that small business was necessarily competitive or necessarily
humane, or that big business necessarily grew by predatory tactics, and it should realize that there
were immense practical difficulties in the way of applying the theory of an “elastic price”).
33. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 119.
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For example, in the drafting of the Securities Act of 1933, Roosevelt
had instructed two different groups to prepare drafts in the period after his
election in 1932.34 After the resulting legislation ran into difficulty when
it got to Congress soon after the inauguration, the President quickly moved
to a third group (Felix Frankfurter et al.) who quickly came to Washington
for a weekend drafting session that produced the legislation that eventually
passed Congress in the first hundred days.35 Berle, over that winter, had
received a grant from the Commonwealth Fund for a project on state
securities laws and would have been as well situated substantively as
Frankfurter to take on the task.36 Berle later told William O. Douglas, his
former colleague on the Columbia faculty, “I have always felt unhappy
that our good friend, Felix Frankfurter, who knows next to nothing about
the subject except on paper, felt that he had reached the final and
everlasting answer.”37
Berle had more interest in a federal incorporation bill that would have
enacted a federal law of corporations, having drafted a bill for a House
committee during the transition.38 A year later he wrote to Douglas, then a
law professor but soon to be SEC chair and later a Supreme Court justice:
“Confidentially, we are working on a federal incorporation law, which I
hope will be presented to Congress in the next session.”39 Implementation
is often more difficult than proposing; this idea failed to make it into the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any federal legislation since.
Frankfurter, who was in England on leave from the Harvard law faculty,
had a greater role in the drafting of the 1934 Act than Berle. Similarly, the
breakup of public utilities and various new regulatory regimes for
investment advisers, mutual funds and broker–dealers all went forward
without Berle.40
Berle’s access to Roosevelt did provide him with a recurring role in
policy discussions including, for example, those between Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis and Roosevelt. Berle’s connections with Brandeis
34. One version came from the work of Samuel Untermyer who had a prominent role in hearings
during what had been the most recent Democratic Administration and the other by Huston Thompson,
a former chair of the Federal Trade Commission. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF
THE NEW DEAL 1933-1935, at 440 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1958).
35. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 82.
36. Minutes of Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund (Oct. 22, 1932).
37. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to William O. Douglas (Dec. 30, 1933) (on file with author).
38. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 82.
39. Id.
40. This is not to say that Berle did not offer ideas. See Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Benjamin
Cohen (Dec. 8, 1934) (on file with Records of the Department of the Interior, Record Group 49, Box
9, National Public Power Committee (Entry 907)) (enclosing “miscellaneous remarks on the general
subject of holding companies”); see also Letters to Felix Frankfurter from Secretary of the Treasury
William Woodin and Representative Sam Rayburn concerning the Securities Act of 1933, in
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 86–87.
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dated back to his youth. Adolf A. Berle Sr. was a Congregationalist
minister in Boston and aligned with Brandeis in progressive causes.41 The
elder Berle provided written testimony for Brandeis during his highly
contested four-month confirmation process in 1916 that made him the first
Jewish justice on the Supreme Court.42 Berle’s first job after graduating
from Harvard Law School that same year (a connection in which his father
assisted) had been at the Brandeis firm, where he practiced for a year
before joining the army when the United States entered World War I.43
Even so, there was a large gulf between how Berle and Brandeis viewed
the best response to incorporated enterprises that had come to dominate
the economy since the Civil War. Brandeis long favored breaking up the
big entities through antitrust and otherwise while Berle recognized the
seeming inevitability of the corporate form and sought ways to combat
them, particularly via government controls. This approach was part of the
corporatist approach described earlier. Berle did not confront Brandeis on
these differences, but neither did he accede to the justice’s preferred
economic solution.44
The New Deal’s legislative agenda faced intense headwinds from the
Supreme Court during Roosevelt’s first term, and Roosevelt had no
opportunity to make an appointment to the Court until August 1937.45 At
times, Roosevelt could not even count on the support of Brandeis,
Benjamin Cardozo, or former Columbia Law dean Harlan Fiske Stone. In
41. The Brandeis Letters contain several letters of Brandeis to the elder Berle and other
references to common causes. See 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 1, at 91 (Feb. 26, 1908), 152
(Sept. 27, 1906), 161 (May 20, 1908). See generally MCCP, supra note 2.
42. See S. REP. NO. 66-409, at 294–95 (1916) (containing letter of Adolf A. Berle of February
18, 1916: “many of the interests represented by the protesting gentlemen are now and have been ever
since I have resided in the Commonwealth, against any emergence into public influence and power of
anyone not of their number and clan. . . . [Brandeis] would adorn the bench and add to the glory . . . of
the greatest court in the world”).
43. Berle’s oral history at Columbia describes the elder Berle’s reaching out to Brandeis after
the younger Berle saw a notice of a job opening at the Brandeis firm. See Reminiscences, supra note
22, at 18. The Brandeis Letters contain a letter from Brandeis to the elder Berle responding to Berle
Sr.’s letters of January 24, 1906 and January 30, 1906 regarding Berle Jr. and congratulating Brandeis
(after the announcement by President Wilson of his nomination of Brandeis to the court). The Brandeis
response on February 9, 1916 said, “It is a great pleasure to have your letter[s] of the 24th and 30th as
it was recently to meet your son and to be reminded of our more frequent meetings years ago.”
4 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 1, at 36.
44. Berle wrote to Justice Brandeis in 1923 seeking advice on whether he should take on a
particular client, but the exchange probably indicates the lack of mentors Berle had at the time more
than particular closeness between the two. See 5 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 1, at 101 (Sept. 28,
1923).
45. After a continuing string of non-success before the Court into 1936, Roosevelt launched his
Court Packing Plan in the winter after the election that year. The plan was rejected by the Senate in
mid-1937, but within a month Roosevelt made his first appointment to the Court with six more
following over the next four years. See also A. C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law
and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2008).
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the spring of 1934, Brandeis told Jerome Frank that he wanted to see Berle
and Tugwell; after meeting with the justice, Berle reported to the President
of Brandeis’s concerns about New Deal Programs.46 During that summer,
Brandeis summoned Berle to his vacation home on Cape Cod to again
express worry about an approach allowing concentration in the economy
and the merits of an Administration response centered on balancing such
concentration with government power as opposed to decentralizing.47 In
September, at Roosevelt’s invitation, Berle participated in a discussion
including the President, SEC chair Joseph Kennedy, and a railroad
president at Hyde Park about the Administration’s approach to
concentration in the economy.48
During this time, when not performing tasks for the President, Berle
was actively engaged with Fiorello LaGuardia’s campaign to become
mayor of New York, an election that took place in November of 1933.49
Arguing on behalf of the reforming Republican against a weak Tammany
incumbent and an anti-Tammany Democrat whom FDR could have
backed, Berle played a key role in keeping the President neutral.50
LaGuardia won the election with a plurality of the vote and offered Berle
the job of chamberlain of the City where he could take on the task of
coordinating the response to the city’s financial crisis. The position was
made for a brain truster. Berle biographer Jordan Schwarz described it as
providing the “opportunity to delve into anything he and LaGuardia
considered fair game.”51 Berle described the job as permitting him “to
cover a good deal of general brain trusting for the Administration on a
wide variety of subjects including elevator strikes, transit unification, the
46. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt (Apr. 23, 1934), in NAVIGATING THE
RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 95 (“Mr. Justice Brandeis has been revolving matters in his head and I think
requires some attention.”). Berle’s letter opened with the greeting “Dear Caesar,” a salutation Berle
was prone to use until Roosevelt sent word in the heat of the court-packing dispute to desist. See Berle
Diary (Mar. 4, 1937), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 125.
47. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 106. Berle was not directly involved in perhaps the most-pointed
message from Brandeis to Roosevelt. After the Schechter decision in 1935, Brandeis told Corcoran
and Cohen, “This is the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the
president that we are not going to let the government centralize everything.” Supra note 32 and
accompanying text; see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT V. THE SUPREME
COURT 551 n.132 (1939) (quoting Harry Hopkins, “Statement to Me by Thomas Corcoran Giving His
Recollections of the Genesis of the Supreme Court Fight”).
48. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 106.
49. See GEORGE WHITNEY MARTIN, CCB: THE LIFE AND CENTURY OF CHARLES C.
BURLINGHAM, NEW YORK’S FIRST CITIZEN, 1858-1959, at 339–40 (2005) (describing Berle in a group
of four reform leaders that helped LaGuardia to power).
50. See Letters from Adolf A. Berle to Arthur Mann (Mar. 31, 1965 & Apr. 21, 1965), in
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 89 (“Roosevelt considered he had a half-commitment to
support [Democratic candidate Joseph] McKee . . . . I like to think I neutralized his influence . . . .
Roosevelt said nothing—and stayed out.”).
51. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 96.
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rehabilitation of the credit of the City of New York, salvaging the real
estate mortgage bond situation, and so forth.”52
II. MOVING INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION:
THE STATE DEPARTMENT, 1938–1944
A. Initial Expectations
There were recurring efforts to get Berle to Washington.
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles pushed during 1937 for Berle to
join the State Department.53 He had the good sense to make the pitch to
Berle as a position that would permit double brain trusting, for both the
President and the State Department.54 What evolved was a mix of
economics, diplomacy, and politics that appealed to Berle’s free
agent/intellectual jobber approach to life.
The Great Depression hung on despite New Deal efforts (including
a second new deal in 1935–1936) and the economy took another dip in the
fall of 1937 through most of 1938. After LaGuardia’s reelection and with
the economy suffering, Berle was among eight men—industrialists, union
leaders, and brain trusters—who gathered at the Century Club in New
York in December 1937 to debate possible changes in the
Administration’s economic policies. Most of the group then met with the
President early in the new year pushing broader federal spending, although
the effort failed to gain much traction.55
As Berle began work at the State Department after he was confirmed
by the Senate on March 4, 1938, he continued to be active in formulating
economic policy. In 1939, for example, he testified before the Temporary
National Economic Committee, a joint group of members of both houses
of Congress and cabinet/agency representatives, on proposals for access to
capital; he suggested, for example, a bank where government agencies
could go for public works or congressional creation of a capital credit bank
for public or private enterprises in need of financing not available via
private lending—all ideas consistent with the state-provision of capital
that was a familiar Berle theme.56
Similarly, Berle continued to be active in politics during his time at
the State Department. For example, he made a trip to Colorado to speak to
Democrats in August of 1939 and to Texas in February of the following
52. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 97.
53. Berle Diary (Apr. 29, 1937), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 126.
54. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 110.
55. NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 154–57, 159–60.
56. Ernest K. Lindley, The Capital Bank, Mr. Berle’s New Idea, WASH. POST, May 28, 1939,
at 9.
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year.57 Of course, his day job was in the Department entrusted with
American foreign affairs and he had been hooked on diplomacy since his
World War I experience. After joining the Army when America joined the
war, Berle was sent to the Dominican Republic to secure legal title to
Dominican sugar for United States interests, an experience that
engendered a lifelong interest in Latin America and in foreign affairs.58
Berle’s experience in Paris, when the Army rushed him and many others
for the sudden arrival of peace negotiations in 1918, impressed upon him
(and many others in the American government) the need to plan for peace
in an entirely different way when faced with another world war. Prior to
his State Department tenure, Berle had been an American commissioner
to the 1936 Buenos Aires conference on peace in the hemisphere, also
attended by the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.59 The
conference, which reflected the Administration’s Good Neighbor policy,
sought to create a tighter bond between the U.S. and the Americas at a time
of darkening clouds internationally. Berle’s continuing interest in Latin
America and his resistance to British trade restrictions and its imperialistic
desires could be seen in this period and later when he got to the State
Department.
But even the diplomatic tasks he undertook once he joined the
Administration as Assistant Secretary—a trip to Lima for an InterAmerican Conference in 1938, negotiating a deal with Canada regarding
the St. Lawrence Seaway, speechwriting after the Munich Conference—
had a strong flavor of one-off tasks of a freelancer.60 A British foreign
office reported, “Neither I nor anyone else I know of, has any idea of why
Mr. Berle was appointed or what he did in office . . . . [H]e has told me
that he was engaged in economic work, and was attending to no routine
matters at all.”61
Consistent with that approach, Berle did not see himself staying long
at the State Department—perhaps six months in his original conception.
As that period was running out, and after he had submitted a resignation
57. See infra notes 81, 86 and accompanying text.
58. See Reminiscences, supra note 22, at 5.
59. See Beatrice Bishop Berle Diary (Dec. 2, 1936), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20,
at 119.
60. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 123–28, 147–55.
61. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 123–24. Such a status was not unprecedented. Ray Moley had
been Assistant Secretary of State at the beginning of the Roosevelt Administration with no diplomatic
duties. Rather, he spent his time in the early months as the primary intermediary between the
Administration and Congress as to the legislative project of the first hundred days. Even so, Moley’s
lack of connection to the Secretary and the Department likely hurt him when the planning and
implementation of the London Economic Conference in mid-1933 took unexpected turns, leading to
his resignation. See Albin Krebs, Raymond Moley, Roosevelt Aide, Dies; Brain Trust Leader Coined
“New Deal”, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1975, at 35.
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letter to the President, he got caught up in the Czechoslovakian crisis.62 He
helped advise Secretary of State Hull and write the President’s speech after
the Munich agreement and his resignation was delayed.63 After going to
Lima as a commissioner to the Inter-American conference in December
1938, he took a leave of absence for six weeks or so to ponder approaches
before returning to daily work at the Department. During 1940, Berle again
expressed his expectation to return to New York after the election.64
Over this period of his early time at the State Department, three
developments reset his decision space, extended his tenure, and changed
the focus of his work. The most dramatic change, of course, was the
outbreak of war in Europe in mid-1939 and the fall of country after country
in the spring of 1940, leaving the United Kingdom seemingly isolated
against the Axis.65 But it was not just a change in world events; there were
unexpected political changes afoot in domestic politics as a possible third
term for Franklin Roosevelt was broached and moved to reality. After his
trip to Colorado in August of 1939, Berle reported to Roosevelt that
Democrats there saw the choices as a third term or Hull.66 Before going to
speak to Texas Democrats in February of 1940, Berle went to see the
President, so as to be warned off of any incorrect messages in the
anticipated speech. Berle then told the Texans, “I do not think the
President wants a third term” but would accept a draft.67 Three weeks
before the election he was summoned to the White House for campaign
speech-writing duties: “It was the old Brain Trust back again, except the
scene was the Cabinet Room instead of the Hotel Roosevelt.”68 Berle was
to serve the third term in D.C. but his focus changed. Economics was still
a key topic, but world events made it more international than domestic and
more focused on structuring a new approach to international economic
relations.

62. See Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt (Aug. 16, 1938), in NAVIGATING THE
RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 181–82.
63. Berle Diary (Sept. 14, 1938), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 184–85 (“The
Secretary also asked the President if he would hold my resignation until we saw where this came out,
which the President promptly agreed to do.”).
64. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 125, 142.
65. By the fall of 1940, in a letter to Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler,
Berle said, “there is no more fascinating place in the world than the State Department, just now.”
SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 125 (citing Berle Diary (Oct. 11, 1940), on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Berle Papers, Box 30).
66. Berle Diary, Memorandum to the President (Aug. 14, 1939) (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Berle Papers, Box 66).
67. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 142.
68. Id.
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B. Designing the Post-War Economic Structure for the World
With the outbreak of war in Europe and the increasing likelihood of
a third term for Roosevelt, Berle’s time horizon for his tenure in
government lengthened and the pursuit of a new international economic
structure occupied a large and continuing place in his work. This Part first
outlines the general approach that Berle and other New Dealers had in
addressing these problems, the evolving understanding of economics in
the world order, and the competition between different parts of the
Administration to plan this structure. Subsequent Parts outline the
evolution of this planning and Berle’s role in it focusing on the
distinctively different tenor of the early part of this period from the later
part.
1. Laying Down a Marker: This Time Would Be Different
Berle, Roosevelt, and other New Dealers who had seen the peace
process after World War I up close approached their task in a new war
resolved that it would be different for them; the time for making peace was
during the war, not after it. Berle had initially served in the Dominican
Republic in World War I, as discussed above. He arrived back in
Washington for a new assignment just as the war ended and a mad
scramble began to negotiate the peace.69 He was among a large number of
army officers dispatched to Paris, talking his way into a room at the main
hotel, joining a group of then-youthful officers who would go on to high
positions in American government—John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles,
William Bullitt; Berle, with Bullitt and others were the “jeunesse
radicales” who had protested the penal nature of the peace that constricted
post-war development.70
Franklin Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, formed his
own perception of the process that shaped his own approach as President.71
Berle and Roosevelt had conversations on these issues going back to the
1932 campaign.72 John Maynard Keynes, to become a key player on the
69. Reminiscences, supra note 22, at 32–34.
70. Berle Diary (Dec. 7, 1918), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 7–8; see also
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., The CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933, at 11–12 (1988)
(describing “a young man’s world at Versailles” including Berle as “acting chief of the Russian
section”).
71. Roosevelt was not part of the official delegation to the Peace Conference but visited Europe
while it was going on. He was a fellow-traveler on the U.S.S. George Washington to the United States
when the President took a brief break from his four-month attendance at the conference. During the
voyage, the future President joined conversations about the League of Nations with the incumbent
President. See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 31 (1990)
(describing Roosevelt’s luncheon with Wilson).
72. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 211.
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British side in the negotiations to come, had argued in the earlier period
for American wealth to bankroll the reconstruction of Europe.73 He was
not successful in blocking a penal peace coming out of the Versailles
conference, but his book on the deficiencies of the peace process increased
his stature.74 His challenge to the neoclassical paradigm as to
government’s role in priming the economy from his 1936 book, The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, influenced New Deal
efforts on spending in 1938 and thereafter. From mid-1940, he was a key
figure for the Treasury on the British side in the process described in the
following section.
Berle continued to have a highly visible profile. His 1940 book, New
Directions in the New World, written in part during his State Department
sabbatical, supported a post-war economic system in which American
wealth would play a role similar to what Keynes had suggested for the post
World War I period.75 Another book that year, by Joseph Alsop and Robert
Kintner, relied on Berle’s unpublished diaries in examining American
diplomacy after the Munich crisis, suggesting America could be drawn
into war.76
In 1941 Berle was active in several important pre-war issues for the
American President. Early in that year, a fight between State and Treasury
on freezing foreign assets while America was still neutral went to the
White House where Roosevelt upheld Berle and the State Department’s
view against such action.77 Berle also played a key role in early 1941 in
securing Canadian acquiescence to an agreement for the St. Lawrence
Seaway. During talks in Ottawa, where Berle initialed the agreement for
the United States, Berle seemed to build Canadian interest for more
integrated defense and economic planning involving the two neighbors.
Later that spring in a meeting at Roosevelt’s home at Hyde Park, the
Canadian prime minister secured Roosevelt’s assent for American lendlease to, in effect, subsidize U.K. purchases from Canada, a concession
that seemed to dull the Canadian interest in Berle’s larger plans for
integrated government planning.78

73. Berle describes first meeting Maynard Keynes during this period, although not working
closely with him. See Reminiscences, supra note 22, at 13.
74. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE (1919).
75. See ADOLF A. BERLE, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE NEW WORLD (1940).
76. See JOSEPH ALSOP & ROBERT KINTNER, AMERICAN WHITE PAPER: THE STORY OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1940).
77. Berle Diary (Feb. 17, 1941), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 358–59. But by
June, events on the ground, in the form of German military strikes against more countries, led to the
State Department agreeing that freezes were justified.
78. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 155.
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2. The Substance to Be Covered by the Economic Plan:
Trade, Monetary Issues, and Development
While the key players agreed on the value of planning, it took longer
to identify what they wanted to plan and longer still to arrive at an
agreement on the plan. Twenty-first century commentators regularly look
back to the economic changes in the international order resulting from
World War II and focus on three international institutions—the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization (and its predecessors)—created at Bretton Woods in 1944
and in other international conferences of the period. Indeed, the planning
from the very beginning of the war focused on the three overlapping sets
of international economic issues associated with these organizations:
monetary policy, capital for development, and trade. Plummeting
international trade after the stock market crash and increased tariffs of the
period cut wealth across borders. Currency manipulation and continuing
challenges from efforts to return to the gold standard in many countries
fueled economic unrest. Insufficient capital was available for stabilization
and development, a challenge made so much greater by war. Problems in
each exacerbated worries in the other two.
The text for international agreements had only been completed for
the IMF and World Bank when the delegates gathered at Bretton Woods
in New Hampshire in the summer of 1944, but Roosevelt’s message to the
delegates was clear as to the integral role of trade in the overall approach
to international economic relations. He noted that the program to be
discussed at Bretton Woods
concerns the basis on which [ordinary men and women] will be able
to exchange with one another the natural riches of the earth and the
products of their own industry and ingenuity. Commerce is the life
blood of a free society. We must see to it that the arteries which carry
that blood stream are not clogged again, as they have been in the past,
by artificial barriers created through senseless economic rivalries.79

The post-war path of the trade portion of this agenda is beyond the scope
of this Article except to say that that path illustrates the interconnectedness
of the various parts of international economic law that the Berle-era
drafters saw clearly, the enduring centrality of the questions that were the
focus of the initial planning, and the continuing relevance of that period to
contemporary debates.80
79. See 1 U.N. DEP’T OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE U.N. MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL CONFERENCE (1944).
80. U.S. and U.K. diplomats picked up the trade discussions in 1945, leading to a conference in
Havana in 1948 approving a treaty that would have set up the International Trade Organization (ITO).
Insufficient support in Congress for American ratification in the new Cold War political climate
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Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Berle’s boss, had long dreamt of
structural response to the tariffs that had grown substantially in response
to the Great Depression and to the disruptions of war that had undercut
trade.81 American planners saw the importance of trade to produce
employment at home and how opening trade for undeveloped countries
could increase the standard of living around the globe. Trade traditionally
held out the lure of comparative advantage. One country (or producer)
could focus more on products in which it had a relative advantage (e.g.,
natural resources available to it, more than to other producers) and could
trade those products for other products which were not as available within
its borders, but more so in some other country. Tariffs could distort this
exchange as countries sought to protect their domestic producers and gain
a greater share of market exchanges. This, in turn, caused countervailing
tariffs and other acts by other countries and the decline of international
trade.
International trade, even with no tariffs, is unlikely to leave any
country with an exact match of its exports and imports, such that there will
be a need for an adjustment mechanism for the currency received in
exchange of the goods. The gold standard provided a long-used, if
imperfect, mechanism for such adjustments. The national currency of a
country that regularly imported more than it exported may well see the
value of its currency (relative to gold) become less valuable and take steps
to bring its imports and exports back into line. But such change in the
exchange rate could lead to inflation or deflation of the country’s currency
that would impact the health of the domestic economy in ways that the
government may wish to encourage or avoid. Thus, there would be a
temptation for a country to manipulate the exchange rate, for example to
make its goods cheaper and the goods from other countries more
expensive. German, Japanese, and even British currency manipulation
during the 1930s illustrated such distortions to the economic status quo.82
Our own times provide current examples of fears of currency manipulation
and imbalances in trade and efforts and a need for international agreements
to prevent crises that have led to currency wars in the past. The gold
standard had another disadvantageous effect in that the natural scarcity of
blocked the ITO leading to a more informal operation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). This international cooperation grew and became more formal and very successful over
time leading eventually to multilateral acceptance via treaty of the World Trade Organization in the
1990s. Disruption of the previous seven decades of international trade policy via Brexit and Trump is
the reality of the current world. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE, A
HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY, pt. 3 (2017).
81. RICHARD GARDNER, STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 101 (1969).
82. ED CONWAY, THE SUMMIT: BRETTON WOODS 1944: J.M. KEYNES AND THE RESHAPING OF
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83 (2015).
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the mineral and its somewhat random distribution about the globe made it
difficult for governments to quickly provide the liquidity necessary in
periodic panics that gripped economies.83
Finally, the destruction of war across the globe greatly exacerbated
the capital needs generated by years of economic depression. The
likelihood of private capital sufficient to meet such needs seemed remote;
the ability of many individual countries to generate sufficient capital
internally called for an international response.
Planners seeking to put the post-war economy on firmer footing,
particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, saw all three of
these challenges—trade, monetary and capital for redevelopment—as
requiring an international structure beyond that which then existed. As the
planning process evolved, initial attention was given first to the monetary
challenge with separate plans being developed each by American and
British teams. The capital needs of reconstruction were coupled with these
negotiations, often as a junior partner until the second week of Bretton
Woods when discussion about the World Bank took center stage.84 Trade
negotiations ended up on a different track, taking somewhat longer to
complete. That description, however, blurs a much more nuanced
development that merits additional attention, both for what it tells us about
Adolf Berle, and for better understanding where we are today on these
same questions.
3. A Rumble Along Pennsylvania Avenue: Competition Among
Agencies of the American Government in Responding
to Post-War Planning
Richard Gardner in his classic book on the period, Sterling Dollar
Diplomacy, observes that, “by the time the United States entered the
Second World War, its great executive departments were engaged in a
major struggle over their respective responsibilities for the planning of
post-war foreign economic policy.”85 The topic naturally linked to both
foreign affairs and financial policy so both State and Treasury could claim
a natural interest. Roosevelt was known to not rely on fixed lines of
authority and preferred to let his advisers and agencies fight it out, as in
83. See MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING AND THE FUTURE OF THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 162 (2017) (discussing the importance of central bank responsibility of two key
aspects of the management of money in a capitalistic economy: “to ensure that in good times the
amount of money grows at a sufficient rate to maintain broad stability in the value of money” and “to
ensure that in bad times the amount of money grows at a rate sufficient to provide the
liquidity . . . required to meet unpredictable swings in the demand for it by the private sector. . . . These
two functions are rather simple to state, if hard to carry out.”).
84. CONWAY, supra note 82, at 237.
85. GARDNER, supra note 81, at 71–72.
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the drafting of the federal securities act described above. The early
planning for a post-war economic structure followed a similar path of
shared effort. Roosevelt wanted both State and Treasury involved and also
the Board of Economic Warfare, which at the relevant time was run by
Vice President Henry Wallace, a possible candidate to be Roosevelt’s
successor.86
State and Treasury, the bigger institutional and political players, were
situated along Pennsylvania Avenue on either side of the White House.87
Hull occupied the senior cabinet seat and had a political role to match,
based on his previous time in the Senate and House and his regular
mention as a possible successor to Roosevelt. At Treasury, Henry
Morgenthau had the advantages of more detailed knowledge of financial
matters and closer personal ties to the President as his neighbor along the
Hudson River. The State Department, with its traditional dominance in
foreign affairs, probably should have been considered the favorite in
betting on how this competition might come out, and the topic seemed a
natural fit for Adolf Berle to have a major role within the Department.
Schwarz described Berle as “probably the highest ranking official in
Washington conversant with Keynes’ ideas in 1938.”88 Berle’s proposals
for the government’s response to the economic crisis of the late 1930s
were influenced by and consistent with the stimulus favored by Keynes in
times of economic weakness.89 Berle repeatedly wrote about the need for
capital and new ways government might provide it.90
Like Keynes, Berle was a public intellectual of the day, comfortable
in writing and speaking about a variety of topics. This period also showed
Berle’s ability to present a broader message of America’s changing role in
the world economy, a topic on which Berle was optimistic. In a Fortune
magazine piece before Pearl Harbor, he forecast that the United States
would emerge from the war as the richest country and with an altruistic
policy, because—in the natural order of things—any economics is moral.91

86. This agency went through various name changes and reorganizations of its own in the period
before and after the United States joined the war. The Economic Defense Board, chaired by the Vice
President, was established in the summer of 1941 while the United States was still ostensibly neutral.
After Pearl Harbor, the name changed to the Board of Economic Warfare, although recommendations
to the President from both the Board and the State Department would be made through the office of
the Secretary of State. HARLEY A. NOTTER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NO. 3580, POSTWAR FOREIGN
POLICY PREPARATION 1939-1945 (1949).
87. State was then located in the building currently known as the Eisenhower Executive Office
Building, adjacent to the West Wing of the White House.
88. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 119.
89. See CONWAY, supra note 82, at 90 and accompanying text.
90. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, and accompanying text.
91. Adolf A. Berle, And What Shall We Do Then, FORTUNE, Oct. 1941, at 124.
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In a speech before the Yale Political Union the previous year, he
presciently observed that it may seem
fantastic today to suggest handing over some of our accumulated gold
as a free gift to re-establish international currency, to let other nations
set their house in order, and thereby reestablish trade and normal life.
But this may not seem so fantastic a few years hence. It seems
impossible today to think of using the enormous resources of the
Federal Reserve System as a means of rebuilding the shattered life of
another continent, but when the time actually comes . . . we may find
the idea looks more like an immediate necessity than a fairy tale.92

The actual outcome, in which Treasury, not State, ended up with the major
role and Berle was eclipsed, not just in dealings with the British, but also
within State, is a revealing part of the Berle story.
4. The Evolution of Post-War Planning in Three Acts: During American
Neutrality; the Rumble Along Pennsylvania Avenue;
and Treasury Triumphant

a. During American Neutrality Before Pearl Harbor
Planning for the post-war period began almost as soon as Germany
invaded Poland in 1939. Two weeks later, Hull appointed Leon Pavolsky
as special assistant to work on the problems of peace.93 By the end of the
year, Hull had appointed a ten-member committee on the Problems of
Peace and Reconstruction that included most of the senior officers on duty,
including Pavolsky and Berle.94 In another two weeks, the title morphed
into the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations to work
through three subcommittees: politics, armaments (soon folded into
politics), and economics. Berle served on the economics subcommittee,
which was the first to organize, and focused on a conference of neutrals.95
In May, after large German gains across western and northern
Europe, a new interdepartmental committee was created—the
Interdepartmental Group to Consider Post-War International Economic
Problems and Policies. The State Department numerically dominated this
group, but its membership went outside the State Department to bring in
92. Eden Statement Issued in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1941, at 4 (quoting Berle’s speech
on post-war adjustments in 1940 before the Yale Political Union); see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This
Moment: The Enduring Relevance of Adolf Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 267 (2019) (describing Berle’s role in presenting an optimistic message of America’s place in
the world in this period).
93. NOTTER, supra note 86, at 17–19.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 22.
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officials from Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture.96 This group
included Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and his Chief Advisor on
Monetary Policy Harry Dexter White, who would play a large role as the
Bretton Woods process unfolded. The last seven meetings of this group in
the last quarter of 1940 were devoted wholly to post-war preparations.97
During this period, Berle worked with Harry Dexter White on an
inter-American bank to finance development in Latin America, in part as
a means to withstand totalitarianism in the western hemisphere. As Berle
biographer Jordan Schwarz described it, Berle’s idea was based on “little
more than a casual conversation” with Jesse Jones at the RFC and faced
resistance from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, but White’s “first-class
missionary work” at Treasury and Jones’s efforts with bankers got the
backing of the President.98 Congressional resistance to funding and the
failure of several countries to subscribe their shares eventually put this
proposal on the shelf. Nevertheless, White and his Treasury team, in the
first half of 1942, developed a Stabilization Fund and Development Bank
proposal for a global response which, along with Keynes’s proposal for a
clearing union, became the fulcrum of discussion from that time through
the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, as discussed in the next section.99
Anglo-American discussions in the period prior to Pearl Harbor
about Lend-Lease, the American provision of key armaments and supplies
to the United Kingdom and other countries without immediate payment,
raised the curtain on what would be the most contested issues of post-war
economic planning. In preparing for talks to be held in Washington during
the summer of 1941, the State Department was attuned to Hull’s interest
in trade and the rising tide of American dominance in international
exchange; they wanted to see trade free of discrimination in favor of
British colonies as part of the tradeoff for Lend-Lease. Keynes, making
his first trip to Washington on behalf of the Treasury, pushed back on such
ideas arguing that the post-war recovery of the U.K.’s economy sufficient
to repay the loans taken out to fund the heavy costs of fighting Germany
would require discrimination in favor of future trade between London and
its colonies. This issue became a key topic of discussion at the Atlantic
Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt in Newfoundland in August
1941. Welles, in reaction to Keynes’s earlier statements in Washington,
pushed for a strong prohibition of discrimination in trade. Churchill
balked. Roosevelt suggested language papering over the divergent views

96. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 131.
97. NOTTER, supra note 86, at 38.
98. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 131.
99. GARDNER, supra note 81, at 74.
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with the precise meaning to be worked out in later discussions, which
would extend well past the end of the war.100

b. After Pearl Harbor
In 1942 with America now at war, interdepartmental planning for
post-war efforts stepped up again and became more detailed. An Advisory
Committee of officials at State and other Departments and members of
Congress was formed and organized into six subcommittees that met
weekly. Berle was active in the economic subcommittees of this group,
chairing sixteen meetings in the first half of 1942 with Dean Acheson, at
this point also an Assistant Secretary of State, chairing other meetings.101
Monetary and banking strategizing was typically a concurrent
activity under the leadership of Treasury. Here is where the most important
preparatory work for Bretton Woods actually occurred. Keynes, after the
Lend-Lease brouhaha, had begun drafting a new plan for monetary policy
based on a sophisticated concept of a “Clearing Union” which would
permit countries to trade “bancor” units. This new currency unit, as an
alternative to gold, would provide more flexibility than a gold standard to
debtor nations (as the United Kingdom had become, with the necessity of
war borrowings). After Pearl Harbor, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau put
White in charge of Treasury’s foreign relations and asked him to “provide
[a] basis for [a] postwar international monetary arrangement.”102 White
proceeded to develop his own stabilization and development plan more
reflective of the United States position as a creditor nation and the rising
hegemon in international financial affairs. The Keynes and White plans
formed the basis for U.S.–U.K. discussions culminating with the
agreements at Bretton Woods.
In July 1942, one of the interdepartmental planning committees—
this one chaired by White—decided on bilateral discussions of
memoranda (i.e., the Keynes and White proposals) with the British as the
way forward; these conversations occurred in September. While Berle had
pushed for discussion of the White plan at the July meeting, in between
that meeting and the bilateral discussions, he promoted his own proposal
100. Id. at 41–42, 46–47. Churchill relied on a statement by Roosevelt in Newfoundland that the
U.K. was no more committed to the abolition of Imperial Preferences than the American government
was to its high protective tariffs. In speaking to the House of Commons, Churchill suggested this left
the British “perfectly free” in terms of actions it could take. Whatever the ambiguity of the language,
economic realities of the war and immediate post-war years left the U.K. with much less room for
action than Churchill’s words might have suggested. See ED CONWAY, Starvation Corner, in THE
SUMMIT: BRETTON WOODS 1944: J.M. KEYNES AND THE RESHAPING OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 82, ch. 4.
101. See NOTTER, supra note 86, at 79–92.
102. DAVID REES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE: A STUDY IN PARADOX 137 (1973).
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for a United Nations Bank for economic reconstruction.103 When Keynes
came to Washington to discuss these plans in September of 1942, the first
meeting was in Berle’s office104 and Berle continued to be the point person
at State in the months that followed. Assistant Secretary of State Dean
Acheson had told the British representative that financial matters were
under Berle.105 The American questions to the U.K. about the Keynes plan
went through Berle in October and came back to Berle in November.106 In
between, Berle gave a major speech on foreign policy on October 15.107 In
late 1942, it seemed to the British and the Canadians that Berle was calling
the shots “for the financial aspects of post-war planning.”108

c. Treasury Triumphant
Behind the scenes things were shifting. In October, Morgenthau and
White went to England ostensibly to discuss finances for the invasion of
North Africa. But the Americans arranged for White and Keynes to meet
for a long substantive session of the two monetary plans.109 After the State
Department’s formal notification in November that it was ready to proceed
with talks on monetary policy between the U.S. and U.K. governments,
the White and Keynes plans picked up their earlier discussions. In the first
part of 1943 as differences still remained, Berle agreed to continue
bilateral conversations but did not want it to appear as if other nations were
being presented with a fait accompli. Thus, Berle initiated discussions with
the Chinese.110 Over the next two months the U.S. and U.K. camps
bickered back and forth as to whether the two competing plans would be
published and if so, by whom, leading to eventual leaks and publications
of both. As the plans had become more detailed and more public, the role
of Treasury had become more entrenched. By early spring, clarity came in
the form of an official U.S. announcement that Treasury “though
consulting with others, would be expected to ‘carry the ball.’”111 In the

103. BERLE, supra note 20, at 418–19.
104. ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 59 (1978).
105. Id. at 56–57.
106. Id. at 60.
107. GARDNER, supra note 81, at 166.
108. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 213–14. This did not mean, even in September 1942, that the
White and Keynes plans were not the basis for the conversation, as Berle himself acknowledged in the
meeting in his office on September 10. Id. at 214.
109. CONWAY, supra note 82, at 135.
110. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 214.
111. VAN DORMAEL, supra note 104, at 83. “After struggling for a full year to wrest from the
State Department the authority and responsibility for international postwar monetary planning,
Morgenthau and White had won.” Id. at 81.
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future, the British would go to Morgenthau, not Berle.112 When Keynes
again visited Washington in September of 1943, Berle sat in on the
meeting but deferred to Treasury leadership.113 When the two countries
and allied nations met the following July in Bretton Woods for the
conferences proposing the IMF and the World Bank, Berle did not attend.
The State Department retained the lead role in negotiations for trade
(labeled by the two sides as “commercial”), but Berle was not a leading
figure in that either. The September 1943 meetings involved a combined
British delegation that came to Washington for both trade and monetary
discussions. Berle was involved but not like the previous year. The White–
Keynes talks continued at long-distance through the fall, winter, and
spring, at Atlantic City in the week before the beginning of the Bretton
Woods conference and then for most of the month of July at Bretton
Woods.
When the President called on Congress to pass the Bretton Woods
proposals for the IMF and the World Bank, he noted his expectation that
proposals for the reduction of trade barriers and other matters “will shortly
be ready to submit to you for your consideration” as part of the United
States taking the lead in “establishing the principle of economic
cooperation as the foundation for expanded world trade.”114 Yet, the trade
part had not made nearly as much progress as the monetary portion. While
the monetary issues had been assigned to Treasury in the spring of 1943,
trade remained under the State Department, with a delegation led by
Myron Taylor, Harry Hawkins, and Dean Acheson—not Berle. Those
talks got no further than broad agreement on the importance of trade to
expand employment and to identify the issues of quantitative restrictions
and trade preferences but put off the next steps until the beginning of 1945.
In December of 1945 the United States invited the wartime allies to enter
into negotiations for a multilateral agreement on trade in goods with
related talks in London and Geneva leading to a charter of an International
Trade Organization approved in Havana in March 1948.115

d. Denouement
As these broader international economic issues moved away from
Berle during the war, one area remained, that of a proposed international
112. Letter from Sir Frederick Phillips (the U.K. Treasury’s permanent representative in
Washington) to J.M. Keynes (Apr. 22, 1943), in VAN DORMAEL, supra note 104, at 81.
113. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 215.
114. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Bretton Woods Agreements (Feb. 12,
1945).
115. But the U.S. Congress failed to ratify the treaty and international trade relations were left
to the more informal process under the GATT. See IRWIN, supra note 80, at 473–83, 500–01.
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civil aviation treaty with the conference to be held in November of 1944
in Chicago. Differences between the U.S. and the U.K. over rights to fly
the Atlantic held up a final agreement, although eventually there was a
treaty and an international civil aeronautics association that reflected
Berle’s work. During the conference held shortly after Roosevelt’s
reelection, White House advisor Harry Hopkins flew out to Chicago to tell
Berle there was not a place for him in the fourth term.116 Sumner Welles
left as Undersecretary the previous year and Hull was retiring at the end
of the month. The new Secretary would bring his own people.
The position offered to Berle was Ambassador to Brazil, which he
did for thirteen months with mixed results.117 He negotiated to be able to
attend a conference in Mexico City in early 1945 and to make a personal
report to the President. But by April, the President was dead and Berle
soon headed back to New York and Columbia.
C. Responsibility Outside of Economic Planning
While Berle had his largest continuing impact on various matters
relating to economics, there were other topics of recurring responsibility.
Latin America, a life-long interest discussed elsewhere in this Article, was
one, intelligence was another. Berle’s government service first intersected
with intelligence in World War I during his time in the Dominican
Republic. After completing his work relating to land titles affecting sugar,
he extended his stay at the request of the governor and the chief of military
intelligence to feel the pulse of the countryside.118 When the State
Department set up an intelligence division in late 1940, Roosevelt soon
asked that Berle coordinate overlap with the FBI and its director, J. Edgar
Hoover. 119 The FBI already operated outside of the U.S. in Latin America
and, in consultation with Berle and military intelligence, decided to create
a Special Intelligence Service to operate in South America. When the U.S.
later decided to set up a separate secret intelligence agency the President
first followed his “competition between agencies” approach with Berle
negotiating for the FBI to have the western hemisphere and military
intelligence with responsibility for the rest of the world. As William
Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services grew, Berle’s role diminished.
Berle’s role in the State Department intelligence led to his
involvement in two other intelligence matters that subsequently gained
political prominence: Whittaker Chambers’ 1939 charges that Alger Hiss
116. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 248.
117. Id. at 254–79 (describing a Berle speech in September that set off a storm of controversy).
118. Id. at 21.
119. For a discussion of Berle’s assignments regarding intelligence discussed in this paragraph,
see generally id. at 171–72.
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was a communist agent, leading to two trials and Hiss’s conviction of
perjury in 1950; and similar charges against the Treasury’s Harry Dexter
White that led to Berle’s statement to another Congressional committee
later in the 1950s. In 1939, Chambers had gone to the White House to
expose Alger Hiss, then a State Department employee, as a communist.120
Marvin MacIntyre, the President’s secretary, told Chambers to take it to
Berle in the State Department overseeing intelligence. The day after
Germany invaded Poland, Chambers revealed his charges to Berle, who
took notes and reported it to the President. FDR showed little interest in
the report, nor did others seem interested in pushing it along. Germany
was the focus—the Soviet Union had by that time signed a non-aggression
treaty with Germany, eventually becoming an American ally after
Germany’s invasion the following year. Eighteen months after the
Chambers visit, Berle went to the FBI in March 1941 and asked what it
knew of Chambers. Fourteen months went by before the FBI interviewed
Chambers and an additional thirteen more months went by before the
Bureau requested Berle’s memo of 1939. More time passed until the State
Department’s security office questioned Chambers in March 1945.
Elizabeth Bentley, another self-confessed Communist spy, went to the FBI
with her own allegations about Hiss in 1945, but there was still little
immediate movement.121
Once the 1946 elections switched control of the House of
Representatives, and in the face of rising tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union, the activity relating to the old accusations
picked up. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held
hearings in 1948 including Chambers’s charges against Hiss, who had
risen in the State Department in the nine years since Chambers–Berle
meeting, eventually serving as a presidential advisor at Yalta and helping
set up the United Nations.122 Hiss’s strong defense to the charges and his
libel suit against Chambers provoked Chambers to produce additional
evidence and that provided part of the basis for perjury charges against
Hiss. When called to testify before the HUAC committee, Berle
downplayed the importance of Russian surveillance as an existential threat
and took a swipe at Dean Acheson, then undersecretary, for the

120. The chronology in this paragraph reflects SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 299. See also BENN
STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE AND THE
MAKING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 293 (2013) (noting the FBI waited more than a year before
requesting Berle’s 1939 memo).
121. STEIL, supra note 120, at 293–95.
122. Hiss was then head of the Carnegie Institute for International Peace. For a discussion of the
HUAC hearings relevant to Chambers and Berle, see generally SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 300.
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Department’s failure to pursue Berle’s preferred hard line toward the
Russians.123
A second parallel thread of Congressional hearings into alleged
communist spying involved charges made against Harry Dexter White.124
White had been nominated by President Truman in January, 1946, to be
the American executive director of the IMF, with the expectation that the
United States would back him for managing director, the top position of
the new entity.125 However, White’s name had surfaced in allegations by
Elizabeth Bentley who had named White as part of a group in Treasury
and other departments who were funneling information to Russia.126 In late
1945, J. Edgar Hoover had informed the White House’s FBI liaison, with
copies to the Secretary of State and Attorney General, warning of the
danger of appointing White to the IMF, but that information did not seem
to have any effect before White’s nomination was announced. Hoover then
prepared a special report for the President that set off alarm bells at the
White House; yet even here the keystone cops caper continued as the
White House’s call to the Senate to stop the vote on the nomination came
too late.127 To avoid signaling American knowledge of the spy ring, the
Administration chose to not seek White’s resignation or removal.
However, the Administration did choose not to put White’s name forward
for the top IMF job, saying it would support an American instead for the
top job at the World Bank.128
Even so, White only stayed one month past the March 1, 1947
official opening of the IMF doors. He was interviewed by the FBI in
August 1947, had a severe heart attack soon after, and testified before a
grand jury March 24 and 25, 1948, but was not indicted. After Chambers
and Bentley both testified before HUAC that summer against White,
White himself testified on August 13, gaining positive reports in the
press.129 On the train to his summer home in New Hampshire the next day
he suffered a second severe heart attack and died the following day.
Congressional attacks on White continued posthumously with Richard
123. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 300–01. Berle, in testimony that seemed to fit more in the
category of settling old scores than about the matter at hand, said that his opposition to Acheson’s
approach in 1944 led to his going to Brazil “and that ended my diplomatic career.” Id.
124. See generally R. BRUCE CRAIG, TREASONABLE DOUBT: THE HARRY DEXTER WHITE SPY
CASE (2004). See also CONWAY, supra note 82, at 334–64.
125. For a chronology of the hearings and related activities discussed in this and the following
paragraph, see STEIL, supra note 120, at 291–324.
126. Id. at 295.
127. Id. at 298–99.
128. Thus, the pattern of an American to head the World Bank and a non-American to head the
IMF, still followed today, is the opposite of what was expected at the time and resulted from the
happenstance of the timeline of revelation of the information about White. Id. at 299–300.
129. Id. at 319–22.
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Nixon revealing in 1950 that he had documents hand-written by White that
had been turned over by Chambers, from the same hidden cache of
“Pumpkin Papers” that had surfaced during the Hiss investigation. In 1951
both Bentley and Chambers testified against the deceased White before a
Senate committee.130 Two years later, counsel for another Senate
committee called on Berle looking for testimony on whether Harry Dexter
White was a Russian spy. Berle replied that he had no knowledge of the
now deceased White and did not much care. “There were Soviet spies and
there was Communist infiltration. Taken together, it made a little trouble
and probably did not vary greatly the course of affairs. . . . But directing
the whole course of American politics in 1954 to examination of the
mistakes of 1944 gets us absolutely nowhere.”131
III. POST-WAR RETURN TO NEW YORK CITY AS A PUBLIC
INTELLECTUAL, PROFESSOR, AND POLITICIAN
After a rocky thirteen months in Brazil, Berle returned to New York
to teach, practice law, participate in state and national politics, and
contribute to the public discussion of ideas. With Truman now President,
Berle no longer enjoyed the access to the White House that he had for
twelve years. The Liberal Party of New York became his platform for
political involvement when he became chair in early 1947. The party
enjoyed some success in pursuing a balance-of-power strategy; for
example, it helped Herbert Lehman beat John Foster Dulles in the Senate
race in 1949. Berle retained some personal influence, serving as part of
Stevenson’s brain trust in 1952 and 1956 and interacting with the
Eisenhower Administration via Nelson Rockefeller (then a top official at
State), Allen Dulles at the CIA, and others. He joined a group with roots
back to the Versailles peace conference to help found Radio Free Europe
and volunteered more than half of his time to that cause in the early 1950s.
In some ways the pattern parallels his political involvement in New York
between 1933 and 1937—with one difference: The third party balance of
power strategy did not provide any significant key policy-making
influence once the election was over in contrast to what had happened in
the LaGuardia Administrations.
Latin America provided a continuing, if still sporadic, entre to
policy-making in an area Berle cared about. In the early part of the
Eisenhower Administration, he journeyed to Costa Rica for discussions
with its President and was involved in addressing its conflict with
130. Id. at 293–99, 318–24.
131. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 303 (quoting Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Alice Berle, his
daughter (Nov. 23, 1954) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Berle Papers,
Box 82).
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Nicaragua, its larger neighbor. At the later request of the CIA he helped
the elected President of Honduras deal with a military coup. Later in the
decade, he continued to be involved as Latin America responded to the
Cuban revolution. More generally, he collaborated with Henry Kissinger
in a years-long task of a Rockefeller Fund report chaired by Dean Rusk,
putting him in the orbit of two future Secretaries of State.132 When John
Kennedy was elected President in 1960, Berle wanted in. He was asked to
chair a transition task force on Latin America, leading to a position as chair
of an interdepartmental task force on Latin America with an office in the
State Department near Rusk (who had said that all roads in Latin American
affairs led to Berle).133 This was a task an intellectual jobber could
appreciate, and he signed on for six months. Unfortunately for Berle, the
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, a CIA operation, dominated the history of
those six months that some in Latin America saw as unilateral
intervention, and one which the anti-Castro Cubans saw as Americans
leaving them on the beaches. With the failure of the mission and the
Administration’s Latin American policy in some disarray, Berle returned
to New York.
Berle had at least one more role on the national political stage. When
Lyndon Johnson became President after John Kennedy’s assassination,
New Dealers like Abe Fortas and Jim Rowe were close to the new
President and reached out to Berle to provide an FDR connection for
LBJ.134 Berle became involved in the Dominican Republic, where his
interest in foreign policy had been sparked a half century before. Berle
sought to walk the line between differing factions, but in late April 1965
Johnson ordered a United States invasion, which Berle, the long-ago
advocate of Dominican self-determination, justified to prevent a Castromounted takeover. The following month, Johnson invited Berle to lunch
at the White House.135 The President also wanted to discuss an even bigger
topic, Vietnam, and here too, Berle seemed willing to have the United
States fight to keep freed colonial people free from communism.
Against this pattern of somewhat humbling results in politics and
diplomacy over the second-half of his career, Berle found a continuing
outlet in his academic and policy writing. Upon rejoining Columbia, he
returned to law review writing (which he had abandoned, except for a
couple of exceptions after 1934) and authored a dozen books. Even more,
132. For a discussion of Berle’s involvement in Latin America issues in the 1950s, see generally
SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 311.
133. Id. at 327–28.
134. For a discussion of Berle’s political activities during the Johnson Administration, see
generally SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 344–51.
135. Berle Diary (May 28, 1965), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 (“To enter history
again, however modestly, is I suppose a compliment.”).
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his biographer Schwarz noted, “Perhaps nothing else during these troubled
times gave Berle more satisfaction than his chairmanship of the Board of
Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund. He saw in the Fund his last great
quest to be a powerful brain truster—a ‘causative’ intellectual making
history.”136 That public policy think tank permitted him to explore, and
support others in exploring, a variety of issues across a broad range of
topics.
Berle’s most lasting impact in the post-1932 period was his own
academic writings. His post-1946 law review articles took some of his
earlier topics and developed them in light of developments since 1932. His
1952 Pennsylvania Law Review article, Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity, may be the most creative of this group. Anticipating
the constitutional debate of the early twenty-first century on constitutional
rights of corporations, Berle started from the then-current picture of
corporate law: “classic corporation law is almost never availed of to adjust
the relations between the corporate enterprise and the community.”137 For
the 1932 Berle, this was a no-brainer: corporations have economic and
political obligations and privileges and are expected to produce an
economic result acceptable to the community. The 1952 article saw the
challenges in extending individual rights, but not in the way that
contemporary cases like Citizens United138 and Hobby Lobby139 have
developed. Berle’s focus was more on corporations being subject to the
constitutional limitations which limit the state itself because of the power
that has accrued to those entities.140
Elsewhere, Berle dealt with a disconnect between corporate theory—
the sovereign’s grant of certain attributes of personality to a corporate
group—and the underlying economic reality of an enterprise operating via
multiple entities within an enterprise.141 Berle put forward a revision of the
classic conception, arguing for enterprise liability. A principal focus was
the then-recent liability-creating Supreme Court case Anderson v. Abbott,
written by his former Columbia colleague and fellow-New Deal
progressive, William O. Douglas.142 In another article, he took on the
136. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 351.
137. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 936 (1952).
138. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
139. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
140. Berle, Constitutional Limits, supra note 137.
141. Adolf A. Berle. Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Liability, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
142. Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 363 (1944) (applying the statutory double liability of
bank shareholders for the bank liabilities to extend to the individual shareholders of the parent
corporation owning the majority shares of the bank despite the normal effect of corporate existence to
act as an insulator from liability: “To allow this holding company device to succeed would be to put
the policy of double liability at the mercy of corporation finance.”). Four justices dissented, arguing
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question of corporate control, as in the then-recent case of Perlman v.
Feldmann, written by another strong New Dealer on the Second Circuit,
Charles Clark.143 A core foundation of this article, common to his other
writing, was the community’s “vivid interest in the policies and operations
of the corporation.”144
In Berle’s last article, he returned to a theme of The Modern
Corporation and Private Property to emphasize the change in the nature
of property resulting from the rise of the corporation.145 Unlike his first
employer, Brandeis, he had long before cast his lot with accepting the large
corporation and using government to match it. In the Constitutional piece
discussed above, Berle outlined the direction law should follow “to assure
that the market power of the enterprise shall not be used so as to create or
perpetuate conditions that the state itself is forbidden to create or
maintain.”146 In Property, Production and Revolution, he suggested the
need for a new role for shareholders with a different kind of governance
role reflecting a more transitory ownership of stock in large corporations
that was essentially more liquid than comparable interests in earlier
businesses. Shareholders in this view act less as an allocator of capital and
more as a “vehicle for rationalized wealth distribution corresponding to
and serving the American ideal of a just civilization.”147 In these ideas,
Berle came closest to a reprise of the ideas of his intellectual trifecta of
1932.
CONCLUSION
Eighty-five years after his most notable intellectual contributions,
Adolf Berle’s impact still can be characterized as distinctive. His public
renown has been surpassed by few law professors before or since. What
explains his lasting recognition? Ideas, like people, come in a multitude of
variations. In one sense, his recognition reflects a particular idea at a
that Congress had not “announced a legislative policy such as the Court announces.” Id. at 374. Berle
was sympathetic to some broadened liability across entity boundaries but would permit a corporate
group to preserve separateness if the parent required the subsidiary to “manage its own affairs, make
its own decisions, and operate as a separate entity.” Berle, Enterprise Liability, supra note 141, at 357.
143. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (controlling shareholder breached
fiduciary duty by siphoning off for personal gain corporate advantages to be derived from a favorable
market situation due to quasi-price controls during the Korean War, but not saying that a majority
shareholder can never dispose of controlling block for a premium).
144. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1958).
Berle argued that Perlman went far in the direction of his position in MCPP—that control belongs to
the corporation, not the shareholders who can deliver control, and that those who run corporations are
stewards for employees, customers, suppliers, and the community affected by their operations. Id. at
1212, 1221.
145. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1965).
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id. at 17.
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particular time. There was a new kind of a corporation in a changed
economic setting that required a different government response. How
many professorial efforts could be fit into such a template? The difference
was the timing. The severity of the Great Depression and then the world
war that accelerated the coming of an American hegemon in global
economics enhanced and deepened the questions he addressed and
magnified the usefulness of the framework he identified. In the absence of
those factors it is not surprising that he could not replicate the impact of
his 1932 ideas as part of the Roosevelt Administration over the next twelve
years or as a public intellectual in the quarter-century that followed. The
match in those times of ideas and current political trends were more
ordinary. Yet a deeper understanding of both what fit so well in the early
1930s and less so afterwards can productively inform our analysis of
current challenges. Berle demonstrated that a law professor skilled in the
nuances of corporate law could simultaneously be a force in broader policy
matters with an effect lasting generations.

